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Note
The Right to Confrontation:
One Step Beyond Bruton
United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d
490 (8th Cir. 1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the simplicity and apparent straightforward language
of the confrontation clause,' its constitutional dimensions are
not easily discernable. 2 There exists an aura of conflict and con-
fusion surrounding this doctrine. The impetus for the framers of
the Constitution to include the right of confrontation for the protec-
tion of criminal defendants purportedly was rooted in defects noted
at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh,3 but even this has not gone with-
out dispute.4 It was over 100 years after the adoption of the sixth
amendment that the United States Supreme Court was faced with
the opportunity to comment on the constitutional dimensions of this
doctrine.5 This has been followed by increased comment and at-
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI.
2. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, & Caml. L BULL. 99 (1972), for an
excellent discussion dispelling any "lingering beliefs in simplicity."
The article focuses on five problem areas: (1) Who are "witnesses
against?" (2) What does it mean "to confront" a witness? (3) Does
the clause allow exceptions? (4) May the right of confrontation be
waived? (5) Are there special safeguards when the use of uncon-
fronted evidence is allowed?
3. 5 J. WIGMO E, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 168 n.17 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) re-
lates that "[a] crucial element of the evidence against him consisted
of statements of one Cobham, implicating Raleigh in a plot to seize
the throne. Raleigh had since received a written retraction from Cob-
ham, and believed that Cobhan would now testify in his favor. After
a lengthy dispute over Raleigh's right to have Cobham called as a wit-
ness, Cobham was not called, and Raleigh was convicted." F. HELLER,
THE SIXTH AXmEDMENT 104 (1951), traces the origins of the confronta-
tion clause to the reaction against these abuses.
4. Graham, supra note 2, at 100, repeated the circumstances of the Ra-
leigh trial in his article, although he noted that there is no reason to
believe there was any link between the origins of the sixth amendment
and the Raleigh affair. He is of the opinion that it is merely a "con-
venient but highly romantic myth."
5. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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tempted refinement up to the present time." Most recently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was faced
with the confrontation issue when the extrajudicial statement of
an uncooperative witness, which implicated the defendant, was in-
troduced for impeachment purposes.7 The court accepted the task
and disposed of the issues with deceptive ease.8 This note will crit-
ically examine the court's decision sanctioning the use of the extra-
judicial statement and the court's handling of the confrontation is-
sue raised by its decision.
II. THE CASE
George Samuel Walter Rogers was arrested and subsequently
convicted of armed robbery on a United States military reservation.
One of the witnesses called by the prosecution at Rogers' trial was
Walter Baker. Prior to Rogers' trial, Baker had pleaded guilty to
the robbery in a court-martial proceeding. Upon direct examina-
tion Baker was unable to identify Rogers. He admitted pleading
guilty to the robbery; however, he testified that he was unable to
remember the incident. He admitted having given a statement to
an FBI agent, but he could not remember the substance of that
statement. At this point in his testimony, the jury was sequestered
to allow further examination of Baker regarding his lack of mem-
ory. Baker read the statement, but he was unable to identify it
as the statement he had made. The trial court informed Baker of
his fifth amendment privilege after Rogers' counsel suggested that
the testimony which the prosecution sought to elicit from Baker
might be self-incriminating. At this point the jury was allowed
to return and further examination ensued. Consistent with his
earlier testimony, Baker claimed a lack of memory and subse-
quently invoked his fifth amendment privilege.
The prosecution called as its next witness an FBI agent, Brown,
who testified that Baker had made an oral statement to him which
he subsequently transcribed. Over defense counsel's objection, the
trial court allowed Brown to read the unsworn and unsigned
statement. The court instructed the jury that the statement was
admissible for impeachment purposes only.9 It was the admission
6. The increased discussion focusing on the confrontation clause is most
directly attributable to its incorporation into the fourteenth amend-
ment and resultant applicability to the states following Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965).
7. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976).
8. But not without a strong dissent by Judge Lay. Id. at 502.
9. The statement disclosed that earlier on the day of the crime Baker
had accompanied Rogers to the Oklahoma Tire and Supply Company,
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of this statement for the limited purpose of impeaching Baker's
credibility which set the stage for the major points of Rogers' ap-
peal.10
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The decision of the majority is a very methodical, and super-
ficially logical, step-by-step approach to*the solution of the main
issues presented for review. Initially, the court properly noted that
separate treatment was required as to the evidentiary and constitu-
tional grounds for admissibility of Baker's ex parte statement."
The decision of the majority on each of these issues largely recog-
nized applicable precedent but poorly applied the facts of the pres-
ent case to the law in reaching its conclusion.
A. Admissibility of the Prior Statement
The court observed that in order for a prior inconsistent state-
ment to be admitted for impeachment purposes it must pass the
tests of inconsistency and relevance. Further, adequate instruc-
tions must be given to the jury outlining the limited purpose for
which the statement is admissible. The court had little difficulty
in finding that Baker's claimed lack of memory was inconsistent
with the prior statement attributed to him. This is rather curious
in light of recent commentary:
The most unsettled aspect of determining what amounts to an
inconsistency is presented when a witness denies all recollection of
a matter about which he had formerly made a statement. Can this
former statement be regarded as inconsistent? The common law
practice-and still probably followed in most jurisdictions-would
not consider such statements inconsistent and would not, therefore,
permit their use even for impeachment purposes.12
where, following appellant's instructions, Baker had purchased a gun
using appellant's identification. The statement further described the
robbery and placed appellant with Baker as two of the three who held
up the soldiers. Id. at 495.
10. Rogers assigned five different points of error. In addition to the two
which are the focus of this note, he alleged that the trial court erred
in the denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized from his auto-
mobile, the denial of several discovery motions insofar as they sought
the criminal records of government witnesses, and the overruling of
a motion for a mistrial based on a comment by the prosecutor. These
assignments of error were briefly treated and summarily dismissed by
the majority of the court.
11. Id. at 498 nn.9 & 10. The court relied on the Advisory Commit-
tee Note to FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3), and California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 155-56 (1970), wherein the Supreme Court rejected the idea that
there is any complete overlap of the confrontation clause and the hear-
say rules.
12. 3 J. WEmNsrTnw, Evm 'c 607[06], at 607-66 (1976). See also 98
C.J.S. Witnesses § 583 (1957):
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The eighth circuit has obviously rejected this "common law"
mechanical test for inconsistency in favor of the more liberal ap-
proach, under which a prior statement is admissible if it is possible
that one reasonable inference would be that of inconsistency.13
This is the focus advocated long ago by Wigmore,14 who favored
allowing considerable discretion to the trial judge in a situation
such as this. In discussing the requirement of inconsistency, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted a concurring opinion from
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals which has been regarded as em-
bodying the spirit of this liberal federal approach. 15
The majority favored this flexible, discretionary approach,
which had been earlier espoused by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Insana.16  The majority opinion in-
timates that since the court in Insana, was justified in allowing a
former statement to be utilized for impeachment, despite a claimed
lack of memory, the same should be allowed as to Baker's state-
ment. However, the facts surrounding the statement in Rogers are
clearly distinguishable from those in Insana. In Insana, the witness
specifically indicated his lack of memory was linked to his desire
"not to hurt anyone."'1 Also, the witness in Insana had previously
testified before the grand jury in detail, and the statements offered
were prior sworn testimony. Further, the witness had identified
the defendant Insana while he was on the stand. In contrast, in
Rogers the witness Baker did not indicate he was motivated by any
noble goal, such as intending to protect someone.'" He refused to
[W]here a witness merely states that he does not remember,
he cannot be impeached by the showing of former statements
with respect to the facts which he claims not to remember,
and the same principle applies where, at the trial, a witness
professes lack of knowledge as to a particular matter.
13. See 3 J. WEINsTEIN, supra note 12, 607(06], at 607-68.
14. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1043, at 1061. But Wigmore did warn
of the prejudicial effect such statements may have.
15. 549 F.2d at 406, citing from Agnellino v. State, 493 F.2d 714, 730 (3d
Cir. 1974): "[a] defendant who chooses to answer questions with half
truths cannot claim constitutional protection to remain silent as to the
other half. A complete answer to a question may be as inconsistent
with a partial reply as one completely different in detail."
16. 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
17. Id. at 1170.
18. The dissenting opinion of Judge Lay relates that "[t]here is no indica-
tion from the record that the trial judge disbelieved the witness" in
regard to his claimed lack of memory. 549 F.2d at 503 n.4 (Lay, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Insana admits, notwithstanding its con-
clusion, that "there may be circumstances where the witness in good
faith asserts that he cannot remember the relevant events. In such
circumstances the trial court may in its discretion exclude the prior
testimony." United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d at 1170.
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testify before the grand jury'9 and he failed to identify the de-
fendant Rogers at the trial. Also, the proffered statement was not
prior testimony, nor sworn to, nor signed by the witness, but rather
it was transcribed from notes after the questioning of Baker had
taken place.
The majority attempted to utilize the Insana opinion as a guide
in discussing the apparent inconsistency between the present lack
of memory and the prior statement, but for all practical purposes
the majority abandoned the teaching of Insana when it considered
the relevance of the Baker statement. Even the flexible approach
would not admit all prior inconsistent statements made by a wit-
ness.20  The use of such statements in these circumstances should
be tempered by a balancing of the interests articulated in Federal
Rules of Evidence 40121 and 402,22 which seek admission of all rele-
vant evidence, with the discretion granted by rule 403,23 which is
directed at providing a degree of protection, while remaining con-
sistent with the liberal federal philosophy.
24
19. This is revealed in the dissenting opinion. United States v. Rogers,
549 F.2d at 504 n.6. It is curious that the majority ignores such factors
as this in its discussion, especially since it believed that the govern-
ment was justifiably "surprised" by Baker's failure to remember and
lack of cooperation. Id. at 495 n.6. Another fact which the dissent
brings to light is that the prosecution read the statement of Baker "in
toto" in its closing argument to the jury. Id. at 505.
20. See note 18 supra.
21. FD. R. Ev. 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means any evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less prob-
able than it would be without the evidence."
22. FED. R. Evm. 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act
of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Su-
preme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible."
23. FED. R. Evm. 403 states:, "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence."
24. This balancing approach has been explained by J. WEINSTEIN, supra
note 12, 1 607[06] at 607-72:
Evidence at which the collateral test is primarily directed,
which is relevant solely because it suggests that the witness
may have lied about something in the past would generally
be excluded because of its low probative value and its tend-
ency to prejudice the jury. Evidence of higher probative
value would be assessed in terms of its impact on the jury
in light of the particular circumstances presented. Such an
approach would probably effect very little change in prior
practice, but would authorize a flexible approach when the
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In discussing the relevance of the prior statement the primary
concern of the majority was whether "the prosecution's case will
be adversely affected if the inconsistent testimony is allowed to
stand. ' 25 The court did express passing concern that impeachment
might be used as a subterfuge to get normally inadmissible evidence
before the jury. However, it quickly dispelled such a thought, rea-
soning that the possible negative inference from Baker's failure to
identify Rogers was "potentially injurious to the government,"28
and that was the end of the inquiry.
The balancing approach is a sound one as outlined,27 but it
proves to be difficult in application because of the inclination to-
ward liberal admissibility under the federal rules28 and the defer-
ence of appellate courts to the discretion of the trial judge. This
difficulty is compounded by Federal Rule of Evidence 60729 which
has been interpreted as dispensing with the common law require-
ments of surprise and prejudice as prerequisites to the admission
of impeaching statements.30 The wisdom of this conclusion should
be severely questioned because it clears the way for prosecutors
to get inadmissible hearsay before the jury, creating the possibility
that it may be given substantive effect despite limiting instructions.
This is a concern which numerous courts have expressed in the
proffered statement has high probative value but is strongly
prejudicial, or when the probative value of the statement is
debatable.
25. 549 F.2d at 496.
26. 549 F.2d at 497. No further mention was made of any possible preju-
dicial substantive effect the statement may have been given by the
jury. The court considered this to be fully taken care of by limiting
instructions. Limiting instructions are by no means a cure-all. See
note 57 infra. It is difficult to understand how limiting instructions
could prevent undue weight being given to the statement, especially
since it was read in full by the prosecution in its closing argument.
While the court paid lip service to the idea of subterfuge, it attached
no significance whatever to the fact that Baker had similarly refused
to testify before the grand jury. This should have put the government
on notice that it could not expect testimony from Baker at Rogers'
trial. Also overlooked was the fact that the FBI agent was present
throughout the trial. This indicates that the prosecution anticipated
the need to impeach Baker. These facts were noted by the dissenting
Judge who was more suspicious of the prosecutor's motives than was
the majority of the court. 549 F.2d at 504 n.6 (Lay, J., dissenting).
See also note 19 supra.
27. See note 24 supra.
28. See notes 18 and 22 and accompanying text supra.
29. FED. R. EvID. 607 states: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party, including the party calling him."
30. 549 F.2d at 495 n.6 (citing United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 189
n.14 (4th Cir. 1975) (opinion of the court), and 531 F.2d at 193 (Butz-
vier, J., dissenting)).
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past,3 ' and the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence should
not be considered authority for repealing these common law re-
quirements. Although it appears that the court is sanctioning in-
creased discretionary latitude in search of the truth, it is clear that
such pursuit is subject "to any constitutional confrontation limita-
tions that may exist in criminal cases.
'3 2
B. The Right to Confrontation
The Rogers majority explained, as it began its discussion of the
confrontation issue, that it was working under somewhat of a
handicap because "the Supreme Court has declined thus far to de-
fine the exact circumstances within which hearsay admitted for a
limited purpose under federal evidentiary rules may nonetheless
offend a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to such an extent that
his conviction must be set aside."33 While this may be a legitimate
concern for the court, nothing in this area of the law is so clear
31. For example, in United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th
Cir. 1973) the court stated:
It is clear . . . that positive damage and surprise to the
party calling the witness are requisite.
... And the absolute rule remains that a party is not
allowed under the guise of impeachment to bring before the
jury an ex parte statement of a witness by calling him to the
stand when there is reason to believe that he will refuse to
testify and when in fact he does so refuse. The party is
bound by his refusal and cannot introduce his prior statement
by the expedient of asking him leading questions.
... Instead, one is impressed that an effort of the gov-
ernment was to bring about damage in order to justify the
introduction of prior statements.
It was also concluded in United States v. Dobbs, 448 F.2d 1262, 1263
(5th Cir. 1971) that "[i]mpeachment is permitted only to remove the
adverse effect of any surprise testimony and cannot be used to supply
the anticipated testimony." These and other examples of this school
of thought were appropriately noted in the dissenting opinion in
United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d at 504-05.
32. 3 J. WENsT N, supra note 12, 607[06] at 607-75.
33. 549 F.2d at 498-99. While it is true that no exact boundaries have
been set, it is also true that no simple rules exist against which to
test the sufficiency of confrontation of substantive evidence. The im-
portant point is that evidence introduced for a limited purpose must
adhere to the confrontation requirements. This proposition was ar-
ticulated in dictum in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970),
where the Court stated that "Bruton's refusal to regard limiting in-
structions as capable of curing the error, suggests that there is little
difference as far as the Constitution is concerned between -permitting
prior inconsistent statements to be used only for impeachment pur-
poses, and permitting them to be used for substantive purposes as
well."
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that an answer is easily provided. Despite its precautionary re-
marks, the majority launched into a methodical survey of the law
relating to the right of confrontation. After a brief discussion of
recent case law, the court noted that the factors to be considered
were the jury's ability "to weigh the credibility of the extrajudicial
statement, whether the extrajudicial statement was crucial to the
government's case, and . . . whether limiting instructions were
given which were sufficient under all the circumstances to protect
the defendant from impermissible reliance upon the statement by
the jury."3 4 Once again it appears that the majority was cognizant
of the appropriate concerns while it artificially applied them to the
facts of the case.
In order to get the right of confrontation in proper perspective
and to comprehend the various positions taken in Rogers, it is im-
portant to trace the evolution of this doctrine. It was clear from
the first time that the Supreme Court approached the confrontation
clause that, contrary to the tenor of the language of the sixth
amendment, the right of confrontation is not absolute. Also, it is
evident that one examining the applicability and basis of this doc-
trine will become involved in more than tracing a single constitu-
tional principle. It is necessary to distinguish it from the other
doctrines which often revolve around it, namely, the hearsay rule85
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The constitutional dimensions of the confrontation clause were
first considered by the United States Supreme Court in Mattox v.
United States.36 The court made it clear from the beginning that
"technical adherence" to the sixth amendment is not constitution-
ally mandated and "must occasionally give way to consideration of
public policy and the necessities of the case." 37 Shortly after Mat-
tox, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kirby v. United States"8
34. 549 F.2d at 500.
35. FED. R. Evm. 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pur-
suant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. Evm. 801
(c) defines hearsay as a "statement, other than one made by the de-
clarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."
36. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The defendant, who had been convicted of mur-
der, sued out a writ of error, which was sustained on appeal and the
case was remanded for a new trial. The second trial also resulted
in a conviction and once again the defendant appealed. His main con-
tention was that the admission of the recorded testimony of two wit-
nesses, who had testified at the initial trial, but who had since died,
infringed upon his right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.
37. Id. at 243.
38. 174 U.S. 47 (1899). The defendant was convicted of receiving stolen
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and Motes v. United States3 9 indicated that the confrontation clause
put a premium on the right to actual cross-examination.
It has been noted that a fair reading of these early decisions re-
sults in a pattern which suggests that the confrontation clause "is
substantially that of the hearsay rule applied to criminal cases.
'40
The goal of the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation are
essentially the same in that each seeks reliability through cross-
examination or something equivalent thereto,4 1 but to say that the
evidentiary rule and the constitutional principle are synonomous
would be reading far too much into these early decisions of the
Supreme Court. In fact, in Stein v. New York, 42 the Supreme Court
expressly disclaimed any intent to raise the hearsay rule to consti-
tutional proportions by incorporating it into the fourteenth amend-
ment, and further attempted to explain away earlier decisions
which implied that a right of confrontation existed under the four-
teenth amendment. Despite these protestations, the decisions both
prior and subsequent to Stein intimated that cross-examination, the
basic goal of confrontation, was an essential element of procedural
due process in various settings.
4 3
goods under a federal statute which provided that conviction of the
principal felon was conclusive evidence in the case against the receiver
that the property had been stolen. Without the introduction of the
conviction of the principal felon into evidence, the government would
have failed to show that these goods were stolen. The Court held that
the defendant's right to confrontation was violated because of his in-
ability to cross-examine the thieves or the witnesses against him at
the initial trial.
39. 178 U.S. 458 (1900). Motes and several other defendants had been
found guilty of killing a man. Part of the evidence admitted against
the parties was a statement made at a preliminary hearing by Taylor,
a co-defendant. Although there was evidence of some limited oppor-
tunity for the defendants to cross-examine Taylor as to his statement
in the earlier proceeding, the Court held that the negligence of the
prosecution in allowing Taylor to escape from custody and the subse-
quent use of his statement operated to violate the defendant's right
to confrontation.
40. 5 J. WIGmoRE, supra note 3, § 1398, at 197 n.9. Therein, it is further
noted that as of 1900, the confrontation clause meant that "an accused
is entitled to have the witnesses against him testify under oath, in the
presence of himself and trier, subject to cross-examination; yet consid-
erations of public policy and necessity require the recognition of such
exceptions as dying declarations and former testimony of unavailable
witnesses."
41. See 5 J. WIGmORE, supra note 3, §§ 1364 & 1369; Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970).
42. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). Defendant's argument that statements introduced
at trial implicating him, which were made by co-defendants, violated
his right to confrontation, was rejected by the majority.
43. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (state bar ad-
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In 1965, the Supreme Court put to rest any question of the ap-
plicability of the confrontation clause to the states in Pointer v.
Texas,4 4 by announcing that this sixth amendment requirement was
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. 45 While settling this
question the court added fuel to the flames of uncertainty sur-
rounding the relationship of the hearsay rule to the confrontation
clause. The majority opinion could be read as intimating, although
it did not expressly state, that evidence admitted under an estab-
lished hearsay exception would consequently pass constitutional
muster. However, such a reading has been strongly criticized by
commentators46 and expressly repudiated by subsequent decisions
of the Supreme Court.
47
Douglas v. Alabama8 presented the Supreme Court with a sit-
uation similar in several respects to that faced by the court in Rog-
ers. The defendant was tried and convicted of assault with intent
to commit murder. The prosecution called a witness, Loyd, who
had been convicted in a separate trial of the same crime. The wit-
ness invoked his privilege against self-incrimination because of the
pending appeal of his own conviction. After his refusal to reply
to questions, he was declared a hostile witness and under the guise
of refreshing his memory, the prosecution read from his confession,
which implicated the defendant, pausing intermittently to ask:
"Did you make that statement?"49 Loyd continually refused to re-
ply. The Supreme Court held that since the defendant was unable
to cross-examine the uncooperative witness his right of confronta-
tion was violated.
In spite of the appellant's contention in Rogers that Douglas
mandated a reversal of his conviction, the majority, noting that a
mission proceeding); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (revoca-
tion of security clearance); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (state
contempt proceeding); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (deporta-
tion proceeding).
44. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The transcript of preliminary hearing testimony
of a key witness, who had since moved to California, which was al-
lowed into evidence over the defendant's objection, was ruled violative
of defendant's right of confrontation.
45. Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result of the majority
but vehemently refused to accept its rationale. They balked at ex-
panding federalism and chose to hold that the right of confrontation
is implicit in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment inde-
pendently of the sixth. Id.
46. See Notes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 366 (1966); 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741
(1965); 75 YALE U J. 1434 (1966).
47. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
48. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
49. Id. at 416,
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"case-by-case analysis" is to be employed, 50 held that the present
case was clearly distinguishable from Douglas. The court consid-
ered that unlike Loyd, the witness Baker admitted his prior convic-
tion of the crime. Further, the court determined that if the jury
erroneously gave substantive effect to Baker's statement any dam-
age was merely "cumulative." 5 1 It seems inherently inconsistent at
this point to conclude that the effect of the statement was "cumula-
tive," while in discussing the admissibility of the statement earlier
in its opinion, the majority noted that if Baker's testimony was to
stand without admission of the statement it would be "potentially
injurious to the government. ' 52 The significance of the statement
to the prosecution beyond its use as an impeaching tool is indicated
by the fact that, similar to the statement in Douglas, it was the only
direct "evidence" putting the defendant at the scene of the crime.
Also, the government read the statement in full during its closing
argument.53
In Bruton v. United States,54 the prosecution was allowed to ad-
mit into evidence the oral confession of a co-defendant, who refused
to take the stand, which implicated the defendant. On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 5 held that the confession was inad-
missible hearsay5 6 and reversed the co-defendant's conviction, while
refusing to set aside that of the defendant, because the trial court
adequately instructed the jury to disregard the confession and its
reference to the defendant. As in Pointer and Douglas, the Su-
preme Court put a premium on the actual ability to cross-examine
the witness. The Court held "that, because of the substantial risk
that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the in-
criminating extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's
guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated peti-
tioner's right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment.
'57
50. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d at 500.
51. Id. at 501.
52. Id. at 497.
53. See notes 19 and 25 and accompanying text supra.
54. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
55. 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
56. Because it was in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1967),
decided one week earlier.
57. 391 U.S. at 126. The Court further noted that the effect of limiting
instructions in this context "is the same as if there had been no instruc-
tion at all." Id. at 137. Some courts have sought to avoid this prob-
lem by deleting the defendant's name from the statement reported.
See Stewart v. State, 257 Ark. 753, 519 S.W.2d 733 (1975); Miller v.
State, 250 Ark. 199, 464 S.W.2d 594 (1971). The Supreme Court has
not considered the constitutionality of this practice, but it would seem
to amplify what was being left out,
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Lay concluded that Bruton was
clearly dispositive of the issue before the court in Rogers.5 8 This
would certainly appear to be true had the majority agreed that the
prior statement of Baker was inadmissible hearsay. 59 The dissent-
ing opinion focused on the unavailability of the declarant-witness
for cross-examination and concluded that this, in conjunction with
the circumstances surrounding the admission of the statement, re-
quired a reversal. This would appear to be the proper approach.
Even granting the prosecution's major premise that the prior state-
ment was properly admitted, the rationale of Bruton indicates that
confrontation rights have been violated. In Bruton, just as in Rog-
ers, at the time the statement was put before the jury, its use was
expressly limited. There would appear to be no reason for conclud-
ing that had the statement been admissible against the co-defendant
in Bruton that confrontation rights would not have been abridged.
Once again, limiting instructions would have been incapable of cur-
ing the error. The majority in Rogers discounted the applicability
of Bruton in favor of subsequent cases which play down the signifi-
cance of actual cross-examination in favor of more fluid criteria.6 0
In California v. Green,6 ' the Supreme Court specifically put to
58. The only difference between this case and Bruton v. United
States ... is that the declarant here took the witness stand
and asserted the Fifth Amendment, whereas in Bruton the
declarant exercised his privilege against self-incrimination by
refusing to take the stand. In both cases an ex parte state-
ment incriminating the defendant was clearly inadmissible
and should have been excluded.
549 F.2d at 502 (Lay, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
59. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out in United States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d
615, 620 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 971 (1976), "it has be-
come well-settled that the Bruton rule is limited to circumstances
where the out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay." It is
submitted here that this is too restrictive a reading of Bruton. The
rationale of the Court would have been equally applicable had the
statement been admissible against the co-defendant.
/ 60. This is not to say that Bruton is no longer good law. On the same
facts a violation of the confrontation clause would result today since
the "incriminations [were] devastating to the defendant but their cred-
ibility is inevitably suspect." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 136.
These are the major concerns today as noted in Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970). See note 64 and accompanying text infra.
Cross-examination has not been done away with as a goal of the
confrontation clause in all contexts. In fact it is very much alive in
cases which involve no hearsay issue. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1973), where it was held that the defendant's right of con-
frontation was superior to the state's policy of protecting juvenile of-
fenders, and any temporary embarassment to the key witness by dis-
closure of his juvenile court record and probation status is subordinate
to the defendant's right to effectively cross-examine a witness,
61. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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rest any fears expressed in reaction to Pointer that the hearsay rule
was of constitutional proportions.6" The Court held that California
could, consistent with the sixth amendment, change its hearsay
rules to reflect a minority view,6 3 but it failed to decide whether
exceptions not subject to any degree of cross-examination would
pass muster under the confrontation clause. However, it was not
long before the Court in Dutton v. Evans64 answered this question.
In Dutton the trial court allowed a hearsay statement, admissi-
ble under Georgia's minority rule allowing statements of a co-con-
spirator during the concealment phase of the conspiracy to have
substantive effect, to be put before the trial court, in spite of the
defendant's inability to cross-examine the declarant. 65 Neither the
prosecution nor the defense called the declarant to testify.6 6 The Su-
preme Court concluded that no right of confrontation was violated
because the statement was not "crucial" to the prosecution or "dev-
astating" to the defense 67 and the statement was surrounded with
certain "indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as de-
terminative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury
though there is no confrontation of the declarant."6  In reaching
this conclusion, the Court attached significance to the following:
62. While it may readily be conceded that the hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, it is quite a different thing to say that the
overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is
nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hear-
say and their exceptions as they existed historically at com-
mon law.
Id. at 155.
63. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966) in conjunction with § 770 provided
in substance that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible as sub-
stantive evidence at trial where the declarant was given some oppor-
tunity to explain or deny the statement at trial.
64. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
65. The alleged co-conspirator Williams, who had been convicted earlier,
was reported to have said: "If it hadn't been for . . .Alex Evans,
we wouldn't be in this now." Id. at 77. A fellow prisoner, Shaw,
was permitted to testify as to the making of this statement.
66. The dissenting opinion suggested that this was probably due to the
fact that to do so would have been futile, because it was inevitable
that the declarant would invoke the fifth amendment privilege due
to his pending appeal. Id. at 102 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion suggested this was due to the fact that the defense
felt that it "would not be in the best interests" of the defendant. Id.
at 88 n.19.
67. This test would appear to link confrontation in the context of a hear-
say exception to the concept of harmless error although not designated
as such.
68. Id. at 89.
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
First, the statement contained no express assertion about past fact,
and consequently it carried on its face a warning to the jury against
giving the statement undue weight. Second, Williams' personal
knowledge of the identity and role of the other participants in the
triple murder is abundantly established by Truett's testimony
[given in exchange for immunity] and by Williams' prior convic-
tion, It is inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown
that Williams was not in a position to know whether or not Evans
was involved in the murder. Third, the possibility that Williams'
statement was founded on faulty recollection is remote in the ex-
treme. Fourth, the circumstances under which Williams made the
statement were such as to give reason to suppose that Williams did
not misrepresent Evans' involvement in the crime .... His state-
ment was spontaneous and it was against his penal interest to make
it.69
The eighth circuit, in Rogers, ignored its own admonition that
this area of the law requires a "case-by-case analysis" and concluded
on the authority of Dutton that no confrontation rights were vio-
lated. It felt that since the conviction of Baker was before the jury
"the reliability of the out-of-court statement was clear. ' 70 Yet, it
is unclear how the fact that Baker was involved in the crime, by
itself, is conclusive on the issue of his credibility. Unlike the situa-
tion in Dutton, the statement in Rogers consisted entirely of asser-
tions of past fact; it was not corroborated by an eye witness; and
the majority specifically ruled that it was not a declaration against
Baker's interest, as it noted further that "[h] e had not yet been sen-
tenced for the robbery when he made the statement, and the danger
here might well be that his interest in obtaining a lesser sentence
in return for his cooperation could have affected the reliability of
the statement."' 71 This is information which was not before the
jury and militates against the conclusion that reliability was "clear"
under the circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dutton is the latest major attempt by the Supreme Court to re-
fine this area where admissible hearsay meets a constitutional chal-
lenge. Its twin tests, focusing on the "crucial" or "devastating" na-
ture of the evidence and "indicia of reliability" leave much to be
desired. However, it does not appear that any test, short of actual
cross-examination in every instance, could be easily applied. No al-
ternatives are readily forthcoming, nor are they anticipated.72 It
69. Id. at 88-89.
70. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d at 500.
71. Id. at 498 n.8.
72. Although Dutton was only a 4-1-4 decision, the majority opinion in
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), adopted the "indicia of reliabil-
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would appear indeed that the Supreme Court is working toward
fashioning a confrontation clause which "ensures reliability while
not hamstringing the states. '7 8 Despite the persistent declarations
by the Supreme Court in Green and Dutton, that the hearsay rule
is not of constitutional dimensions, it has been established in several
circuits that since reliability is the goal, a statement admitted under
a recognized exception to the hearsay rule is presumptively consti-
tutional.
7 4
The approach of the majority in Rogers is not atypical of that
taken by other reviewing courts. What the Supreme Court in Dut-
ton referred to as "indicia of reliability" have been adopted as a
checklist, the presence of one or more, mechanically applied, being
assumed conclusive on the issue of credibility. The error in such
an approach is manifest because in any given situation the court
may conclude that the possibility of faulty recollection is "remote"
or that the conviction of the declarant put him "in a position to
know" that the defendant was involved in the crime. The use of
such catch phrases is meaningless out of the context of Dutton
where they were fostered. Even in Dutton they weren't addressed
to the primary inquiry of whether the statement was in fact made.
The decision of the court in Rogers illustrates the problem of
working with the present amorphous standards. It has been sug-
gested that something similar to the present approach is adequate
and the "developing precedents" can explain what constitutes requi-
site reliability.75 This may well be the approach required, but in
order to fashion such a system increased vigilance and restraint are
needed on the part of judges at the trial and the appellate levels.
Robert L. Bals '78
ity standard." In doing so it apparently undercut the earlier decision
of the Warren Court in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), which
required a good faith effort on the part of the prosecutor to secure
the attendance of all witnesses.
73. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Excep-
tion in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1378, 1405 (1972).
74. See United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and
Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086
(1972) where the court noted:
Neither the Sixth nor the Fourteenth Amendment is violated
when hearsay is admitted in accordance with recognized ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule because the fundamental values
and notions which are the foundation for the exception and
which permit its introduction as a matter of the law of evi-
dence also satisfy the Sixth Amendment's demand for indicia
of reliability.
75. Annotation, Interplay of the Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay
Rule, 29 ARK. L.. Rsv. 375, 384 (1975).
